

SAMUN XIV



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Letters from Presidents

Letter from President Vives

Dear Delegates,

It is a pleasure and an honor to extend a warm and cordial welcome to all of you on behalf of the entire SAMUN XIV staff to the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC). My name is Carlos Jose Vives and I am one of your DISEC committee presidents.

First of all, I would like to emphasize the achievement and recognition that each of you deserves by participating in this type of event because it requires a truly unique courage and commitment to dedicate part of your free time to research, analysis, and discussion of issues of international relevance and that highlight each of you as leaders and extraordinary people out of the ordinary.

Respect, collaboration, and commitment are just some of the indispensable and key values for any delegate who is part of any model of the United Nations, for this reason, I invite you to always keep these values in mind throughout your debates, interventions, and motions to the table and other delegates in the committee.

I hope you enjoy this opportunity to grow your hunger for knowledge and leadership skills, which will further distinguish each of you. See this event as an opportunity not only to bring



out your skills as delegates but also to expand your relationships further and strengthen or create new friendships that will last a long time.

Finally, we offer you this introductory guide so that you can learn more about the topics to be discussed and better formulate your positions regarding the issues to be debated. We hope you can get the most out of it.

Without anything else to add, I wish the best for each of you and that you enjoy this opportunity to the fullest. Feel free to contact us through this email (carlos.vives-gutierrez@cbsm.edu.co) to resolve any questions that may arise.

Sincerely,

Carlos Jose Vives Gutierrez

DISEC President

Letter from President Castro

Dear Delegates,

It is a great pleasure for me to welcome you to this year's edition of SAMUN and, more precisely, to the DISEC Committee. My name is Cristina Castro, and I am one of your committee presidents.



At the outset, I would like to congratulate each and one of you on becoming a part of this prestigious committee. Your very presence is reflective not only of your dedication to global causes but also your resilience in challenging yourself toward change. It is going to be an experience which would be demanding in critical thinking, effective collaboration, working out complex international problems while fine-tuning leadership skills, opening up perspectives.

Our debates will be guided by respect for one another's opinions, an open mind, eagerness for meaningful dialogue. I encourage you to treat this committee not just as a platform from which to showcase your talents but also to learn from each other, foster lifelong friendships, and grow intellectually and personally. As we embark on this journey together, approach each discussion with curiosity and determination.

Let me remind you, this is not only a simulated committee; it is a place where ideas become translated into action and where you, as delegates, will become the agents of change. May this experience spark a desire within you to make a difference not only in this committee but in every pursuit you enter. As we work in concert on the problems facing humanity, let us remember that what we do has profound consequences in the world and commit ourselves to finding meaningful solutions to the challenges we face.



As your president, I expect your utmost commitment and dedication to the discharge of your responsibilities as delegates. My co-president and I will be guiding and supporting you throughout this journey to make your experience within the model as rewarding and memorable as possible. Please do not hesitate to reach out whenever you have any questions or need assistance.


With warm regards,

Cristina Castro

DISEC President

History of the Committee (Introduction to DISEC)

The UN established the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) as the first committee of their General Assemblies (GAs) in 1945. This committee is responsible for addressing and dealing with global challenges related to disarmament and weaponry on a global scale and threats that may harm international peace. The DISEC committee also collaborates closely with the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNODA) to correctly manage the actions the UN takes in this situation.



As the primary committee for debate on disarmament at the UN, DISEC tackles a wide range of issues, including the regulation of conventional weapons, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and measures to address emerging issues such as cyber warfare and autonomous weapons. The committee emphasizes fostering dialogue, consensus-building, and collaboration among nations to craft resolutions that reflect the collective will of the international community.



Introduction Topic A: Regulating Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) and Lethal Autonomous Robots (LARs)

Key Concepts

- 1. Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS): Weapon systems capable of identifying, selecting, and engaging targets without direct human intervention.
- Lethal Autonomous Robots (LARs): Fully autonomous robotic systems capable of delivering lethal force.



- 3. International Humanitarian Law (IHL): Legal frameworks governing conduct in armed conflict, including principles of distinction and proportionality.
- 4. Artificial Intelligence (AI): The theory and development of computer systems able to perform tasks normally requiring human intelligence.

Introduction



The evolution artificial rapid of intelligence (AI) and autonomous systems worldwide revolutionized has many international community sectors, including warfare. Introducing unprecedented capabilities and

technological advances in the form of Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) and Lethal Autonomous Robots (LARs). These technologies are capable of identifying, selecting, and engaging targets without direct human interaction to automatize and enhance the rapidness in response against threats that suggest a major danger to society. While the promoters of this kind of technology ensure that they are reliable and significantly reduce the risk of military personnel, it also represents a paradigm shift in military operations due to the complex ethical, legal, and security challenges these new systems entail.




The absence of universally accepted regulatory frameworks surrounding AWS and LARs has spurred debate on their deployment, potential misuse, and implications for international security. As members of the international community race to develop and deploy their versions of these systems, there is a growing concern regarding the lack of accountability, the possibility of unintentional escalations in conflict, and the ethical dilemma of delegating life-and-death decisions to machines.

Despite these potential benefits, the deployment of AWS and LARs has sparked widespread debate. Ethical concerns dominate the discourse, as critics question whether machines should be entrusted with



life-and-death decisions. The lack of human oversight raises fears of malfunction, hacking, and misuse, which could lead to unintended escalations in conflicts. Furthermore, the absence of clear accountability mechanisms challenges the enforcement of international humanitarian law, as it remains unclear who would bear responsibility for unlawful acts committed by autonomous systems.



The international community remains divided on how to approach the regulation of AWS



and LARs. Some states and advocacy groups, such as the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, call for a preemptive ban on fully autonomous lethal weapons. They argue that such systems inherently violate ethical norms and pose unacceptable risks to global stability. Conversely, other nations view AWS and LARs as indispensable tools for maintaining strategic superiority and argue for a more nuanced approach, advocating for the development of guidelines to govern their use.

Efforts to address the challenges posed by AWS and LARs include ongoing discussions within the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). However, progress has been slow, hindered by divergent national interests and the rapid pace of technological advancement. Non-governmental organizations and civil society continue to play a vital role in pushing for greater transparency, accountability, and international cooperation in this domain.

The regulation of AWS and LARs is not merely a technological issue; it is a moral and political imperative. As warfare becomes increasingly automated, the need for robust legal frameworks and ethical guidelines has never been more urgent. DISEC's role in facilitating dialogue and fostering consensus among member states is critical to ensuring that the deployment of these technologies aligns with the principles of humanity and the rules of armed conflict. Delegates must grapple with the complexities of this issue, balancing the potential benefits of AWS and LARs against the profound risks they entail.



Current situation and approach



One of the most famous examples of integrating advanced technology into defense systems is Israel's Iron Dome and its Iron Beam system, this systems which are constantly evolving, and have been able to prevent the collision of missiles directed at Israel's territory during the

Hamas conflict, being key for the study and development of militarized technological systems. While not fully autonomous, these systems demonstrate the growing reliance on artificial intelligence and automation in modern warfare. The Iron Dome has been instrumental in intercepting short-range peers and artillery shells, protecting civilian populations during conflicts such as the Hamas conflict. Similarly, the Iron Beam, a rigid energy weapon, represents the cutting edge of automated defense technologies. These systems leverage the potential benefits of autonomous systems to minimize disruption and damage in conflict zones. However, its use raises critical questions about how AWS and LARs can be implemented in offensive operations. For example, what safeguards ensure these systems adhere to international humanitarian law during combat? What happens if these systems are hacked or malfunctioned in critical situations? The lack of clear international standards exacerbates these concerns.



Real-life incidents can alleviate the urgency of addressing these issues. For example, during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabaj conflict, Azerbaijan's use of autonomous drones demonstrated the



potential of these systems to shift the balance of power in warfare. However, this also caused a major civilian uproar and raised questions about the payoff. Similarly, reports of autonomous drone deployments in Libya without human oversight further fuel the debate about their ethical and legal

implications. The international community must urgently address these challenges. While the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) continues to debate AWS regulation, progress is hampered by various national interests and strategic priorities. Countries with advanced AI capabilities, such as the United States, China, and Russia, have shown reactions to agreeing to restrictive measures, for fear of losing a strategic sale.

Non-state actors have also made a breakthrough. The possibility of extremist organizations deploying or acquiring autonomous weapons systems is compounding the complexity of this issue. The possibility of these groups using AWS in asymmetric warfare scenarios could have catastrophic consequences, which further alleviate the need for robust international collaboration and regulation. In conclusion, while AWS and LARs offer unprecedented opportunities to improve security and operational efficiency, their use is unregulated and



poses major risks to global stability. DISEC must support the effort to establish comprehensive lines that balance innovation with the imperatives of ethical conduct, accountability, and compliance with international law.

Relevant Actors



<u>The United States</u> has led the development of Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) and Lethal Autonomous Robots (LARs), exemplified by drone strikes using AI-driven targeting systems. The usage of drones in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated their

strategic advantages, reducing risks to soldiers and securing the elimination of multiple dangerous targets during the conflict. However, incidents like the 2019 drone strike in Kabul, which ended civilian lives, underscore the ethical challenges. These events highlight ongoing debates about regulating AWS to ensure accountability, minimize civilian harm, and balance military innovation with compliance with international humanitarian law.

<u>Russia</u> has made significant progress in developing this kind of technology, with systems such as the Uran-9 combat robot demonstrating advances in artificial intelligence integration and

demonstrating advances in artificial intelligence integration and battlefield automation. These technologies aim to improve operational efficiency by enabling

remote execution of reconnaissance and combat tasks. However, practical challenges, such as



Uran-9's performance issues, including target selection problems and communication errors, highlight technological limitations. Reports of failures and malfunctions raised concerns about the reliability of these systems in the international community, especially in high-risk combat scenarios.



<u>China</u> has rapidly become a key player in technological advancements, especially in developments with military purposes, leveraging its advances in artificial intelligence and robotics. Systems

such as autonomous drones and unmanned ground vehicles are central to China's military modernization strategy, which aims to improve precision and reduce human involvement in high-risk operations. However, the potential for these technologies to destabilize regional security, especially in contested areas such as the South China Sea, raises concerns about escalating tensions and encouraging an autonomous arms race.

Israel has become a global leader in military technology through its investment in Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) and Lethal Autonomous Robots (LARs). Innovations like the Iron Dome have revolutionized



defense, showcasing the potential of AI in warfare and solidifying Israel's position as a technological powerhouse. However, these advancements unleashed ethical concerns, particularly regarding the delegation of life-and-death decisions to machines. Critics highlight



the risks to civilians and the lack of human empathy, fueling debates over the balance between progress and humanitarian values.

QARMAs

- What are the technological and legal challenges of deploying Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) and Lethal Autonomous Robots (LARs) in warfare, and how can they be addressed?
- 2. What measures could be implemented to regulate the usage and development of AWS and LARs worldwide?
- 3. What ethical dilemmas arise from making life-and-death decisions about Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) and Lethal Autonomous Robots (LARs)?

Questions

- 1. What is your delegation's position regarding the development and usage of Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) and Lethal Autonomous Robots (LARs)?
- 2. Has your delegation been part of previous international discussions of frameworks related to AWS and LARs?
- 3. Does your delegation currently invest in the development of Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) and Lethal Autonomous Robots (LARs) or similar technologies? If so, with what purpose?



4. Does your delegation view Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) and Lethal Autonomous Robots (LARs) as ethical tools in warfare, or do they inherently conflict with international humanitarian norms?

Useful Links

- <u>https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/22/24/9916</u>
- <u>https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/autonomous-weapon-systems</u>
- <u>https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archive</u> <u>s/May-June-2017/Pros-and-Cons-of-Autonomous-Weapons-Systems/</u>
- <u>https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/document/file_list/4221-002-autonomous-wea</u>
 <u>pons-systems-full-report.pdf</u>
- <u>https://www.amnesty.nl/content/uploads/2015/04/autonomous_weapons_systems.pdf?</u>
 <u>x41799</u>
- <u>https://www.ohchr.org/en/stories/2013/05/call-moratorium-development-and-use-letha</u> <u>l-autonomous-robots</u>
- <u>https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20385306</u>
- <u>https://www.euronews.com/next/2024/10/02/the-iron-dome-how-does-israels-missile-</u> <u>defence-system-work</u>
- <u>https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/u-s-military-investments-in-autonomy-and-aicosts-benefits-and-strategic-effects/</u>



- <u>https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/08/understanding-the-global-debate-on-</u> lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems-an-indian-perspective?lang=en¢er=india
- <u>https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-30179-8_1</u>
- <u>https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-86/jfq-86_86-93_Hall.pdf</u>

Introduction Topic B: The Role of Private Military and Security Companies in <u>Armed Conflicts</u>

Key Concepts

- 1. **Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs):** Private entities that provide a range of military, logistical, intelligence, and security services. PMSCs operate on a for-profit basis and can be contracted by governments, corporations, or other organizations to perform tasks traditionally associated with national armed forces.
- 2. **Montreux Document:** An international instrument that outlines the legal obligations of states regarding PMSCs operating in conflict zones.
- 3. **Mercenary:** An individual who is specifically hired to engage in armed conflict for personal gain, rather than for a national or ideological cause. Unlike Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), which may provide a broader range of services including logistics and training, mercenaries are primarily focused on direct combat roles.



Introduction

Private Military and Security Companies, now referred to as PMSCs, have gained large power in contemporary wars, with such companies offering several military, logistical, intelligence, and security services. These companies, among



them the well-known Blackwater, now Academi, and the Wagner Group, have evolved from traditional security roles to combat operations, military training, intelligence gathering, and logistical support. While they fill critical gaps where state forces may be insufficient, the rise of PMSCs poses serious concerns about accountability, regulation, and human rights violations. This has led to many abuses and gray areas, particularly in unstable regions. PMSCs traditionally work in conflict zones where state military capabilities are simply not good enough or a government wants to keep their hands clean. This trend has been particularly pronounced in asymmetric warfare contexts, such as those seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, where PMSCs have taken on roles traditionally reserved for national armed forces. Their engagements have not only included protective services but also direct combat support, raising critical questions about accountability and the legal frameworks governing their operations. This privatization of military functions has further allowed states to outsource their functions in warfare, especially where national forces may be stretched



beyond their capabilities or lack altogether. PMSCs are contracted to protect military personnel and assets, maintain weapon systems, and engage in direct combat, thereby creating ambiguity between state and non-state actors in conflict zones. This increasing reliance has brought significant alterations in the dynamics of warfare, as most of their operations take place in conditions where accountability and oversight are minimal.



Legal and ethical issues remain complex and highly contentious for PMSCs. International Humanitarian Law, which guides the actions of parties within an armed conflict, has no direct application to the

status of PMSCs. While employees of PMSCs are generally classified as civilians under IHL, this status can change if they engage directly in hostilities. The distinction between PMSCs and mercenaries is also crucial; under IHL, the term "mercenary" has a specific definition that does not encompass most PMSC personnel. This ambiguity raises questions about accountability for human rights violations and war crimes committed by PMSC contractors. States hiring PMSCs have the legal obligation to ensure that IHL standards are upheld by these companies. Enforcement mechanisms are generally very weak or absent. The 2008 Montreux Document attempted to explain what states were expected to take on board as



responsibilities regarding the actions of PMSCs during conflict, but difficulties do arise in their implementation of international legal norms.

As the role of PMSCs has continued to evolve, their implication in armed conflicts raises critical ethical questions about the privatization of violence and its implications for civilian protection and human rights. The potential abuses by PMSCs are immense, given the autonomous nature of their operations and serious lacunae regarding effective oversight. This illustrates the urgent need for comprehensive regulatory frameworks that take into consideration the peculiar modern-warfare challenges posed by PMSCs, while guaranteeing accountability and adherence to international legal norms in the protection of human rights in conflict situations.

Current Situation and Approach



With modernity, PMSCs have been quite instrumental in warfare and security operations. Their role has been extended with each passing conflict across the world, as well as with the growing need for specialized military services. As a matter of fact, these are the kinds of tasks that governments now



rely on such contractors for: logistics support, intelligence, training of local military units, and even combat operations. This trend is more pronounced in areas of instability, where states try to reduce political risks and public scrutiny by contracting military functions to private entities.

The strategic employment of PMSCs has serious repercussions for defense policies worldwide. The United States, Russia, and China have all incorporated PMSCs into their military strategies, employing them on a wide range of missions from peacekeeping duties to covert foreign interventions. For example, the Wagner Group has become notorious for its involvement in conflicts throughout Africa and the Middle East, acting in ways that align with state interests while providing a degree of plausible deniability for the governments involved. This model enables states to conduct military operations without using regular troops, thus avoiding the political implications associated with direct military involvement.

Currently, a plethora of PMSCs are active all over the world, and each is significant in different aspects of security matters. One of the most well-known private military and security companies is Academi, earlier called Blackwater. It was





established in 1996 by former Navy SEAL Erik Prince and gained considerable attention since its involvement in the Iraq War, especially after the 2007 Nisour Square incident when its contractors were involved in the extermination of multiple civilian lives. Although controversy surrounded it in the past, Academi continues to operate by providing security services to government and corporate clients, including protective services to U.S. diplomatic missions. G4S Secure Solutions is a British multinational security company that has an enormously diverse array of services, including managing risk and private military services. G4S operates in more than 85 countries and has played security roles from unarmed guarding up to high-risk environments, despite criticism of the company's alleged human rights abuses across some regions. Other major PMSCs include DynCorp International, which offers a diverse range of services such as security support, aviation services, and logistics. DynCorp has been involved in numerous government contracts, including those related to military training and support operations in conflict zones like Afghanistan and Iraq. Additionally, the Wagner Group, a Russian private military company founded by Dmitry Utkin, has gained international attention for its operations in conflicts such as those in Syria and Ukraine. Wagner is linked to the Russian government and has often been described as a tool through which Russia advances its interests abroad without direct state involvement. Its activities have raised significant concerns about accountability and adherence to international law.

The rise of PMSCs also raises significant legal and ethical considerations. The lack of a universally accepted legal framework governing their activities creates a regulatory gap that



SAMUN XIV #Turning Challenges into Opportunities





complicates accountability for actions taken during conflicts. While the applicability of IHL to armed conflicts can be determined, the intricacies of the status and obligations of PMSC personnel are more difficult to ascertain. Most employees are

classified as civilians under IHL; however, if they engage in direct participation in hostilities, they could lose the protection afforded to them as non-combatants. This ambiguity has led to increased calls for clearer regulations that ensure IHL and human rights standards are adhered to.

The international responses to these challenges include the Montreux Document, which clarifies the states' responsibilities in hiring PMSCs and fosters best practices in the operation of the latter. It reiterates that existing legal norms relevant to the activities of private military and security companies during hostilities are still valid and reaffirms the commitment to full transparency and accountability of their activities. But despite this development, the general perception about PMSCs remains divided because of isolated cases of abuse and other misbehaviors that dented public confidence in their work.



As technology continues to redefine the future of combat, PMSCs will further advance their capabilities in areas like cyber defense and unmanned systems. The changing nature of military privatization necessitates a more robust regulatory framework, which should be capable of not only dealing with current challenges but also gazing into the future. Policymakers will have to tread this complex landscape with care to ensure that PMSCs are integrated into national defense strategies in a manner that is both legally sound and ethically fitting while protecting human rights in conflict zones.

Relevant Actors



<u>The United States</u> has extensively utilized PMSCs, particularly during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, where companies like Blackwater provided security and logistical support. The Department of Defense (DOD) has relied

heavily on private security contractors to provide various services during combat operations, marking a significant shift in military strategy. Reports indicate that as of 2011, there were over 28,000 private security contractor personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq, raising concerns about accountability and oversight due to numerous high-profile incidents involving these contractors



In **Russia**, the Wagner Group is a prominent example of a private military company involved in various conflicts. This group operates as a de facto state proxy, engaging in combat roles while raising significant concerns about human rights violations and adherence to international law. The Wagner Group's actions have complicated the international legal landscape, as they often act without formal state oversight, leading to allegations of abuses and violations of humanitarian law in conflict zones like Ukraine and Syria.



The United Kingdom has a historical context of employing PMSCs for military operations, particularly in post-conflict zones such as Iraq. Companies like Aegis Defence Services have been involved in

providing security services during critical periods. While the UK government acknowledges the need for regulation of PMSCs, it has faced criticism for insufficient oversight regarding their activities abroad. This lack of comprehensive regulatory measures raises concerns about accountability and the potential for human rights violations by private contractors operating in conflict areas.

Countries like <u>Mali</u> have increasingly turned to PMSCs for security assistance amid rising insurgencies and instability. The involvement of groups such as the Wagner Group has sparked





debates about national sovereignty and the implications of foreign military presence within their borders. Reports indicate significant civilian casualties linked to PMSC operations in Mali, raising alarms about accountability and compliance with international law. As these nations grapple with security challenges, the role of PMSCs is becoming more pronounced, further complicating conflict resolution dynamics in the region.

QARMAs

- What are the operational and regulatory challenges faced by Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) in conflict zones, and what strategies can be implemented to mitigate these challenges?
- 2. What implications does the involvement of PMSCs have on state sovereignty and accountability in armed conflicts, particularly regarding their impact on traditional military roles?
- 3. What international legal frameworks can be established or strengthened to regulate the activities of PMSCs to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) and to protect human rights?



Questions

- What is your delegation's stance on the role of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) in contemporary armed conflicts? Do you support their use or advocate for stricter regulations?
- 2. Is your delegation currently involved in funding or utilizing Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) for military or security purposes? If yes, what are the goals of this engagement?
- 3. Does your delegation view the presence of PMSCs as a necessary component of modern military operations, or do you believe their involvement poses significant risks to international humanitarian principles and ethical standards?
- 4. Has your delegation engaged in any previous international discussions or initiatives aimed at establishing guidelines for the operation of PMSCs? If so, what outcomes were achieved?

Useful Links

- <u>https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4723569</u>
- <u>https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R40835</u>
- <u>https://www.icrc.org/en/law-and-policy/private-military-and-security-companies</u>
- <u>https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2023/04</u>
- <u>https://www.fides.org/es/news/73940-AFRICA_No_solo_Wagner_las_Companias_M</u>
 <u>ilitares_Privadas_PMC_y_el_futuro_del_monopolio_de_la_fuerza</u>



- <u>https://www.britannica.com/topic/private-military-firm</u>
- <u>https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/66700/private-military-companies-final-31-a</u> ugust.pdf
- <u>https://ucp-group.com/private-military-contractors-pmcs-service/</u>
- <u>https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c514zz52gwvo</u>
- <u>https://ine.org.pl/en/private-military-companies-and-combating-terrorism-in-mozambi</u>

<u>que/</u>